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Abstract
This paper examines Harsanyi’s preference utilitarianism by giving a double-
profile approach. In this approach, each individual has two kinds of preference
relations: personal private preferences and personal ethical preferences. More-
over, the social ethnical observer has its own social preferences. We assume that
those preference relations all satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. Us-
ing Harsanyi’s axioms, personal private preferences are aggregated into personal
ethical preferences, and then personal ethical preferences are aggregated into the
social preferences. We give certain axioms on those aggregation steps to explain
the diﬀerence between the two steps. We construct this approach so that we can
study how interpersonal utility comparisons are involved in those steps.
1. Introduction
Harsanyi’s utilitarianism, proposed in Harsanyi [10], [11], [12], [13] and some other
papers, has been controversial in various respects. Roughly speaking, it claims that a
welfare judgement should be based on the welfare function defined as the weighted sum
of individual utility values:
w(p) =
P
i
αiui(p). (1.1)
In this paper, we will provide a double-profile approach in order to facilitate critical ex-
aminations of some controversial respects. In this section, we explain our approach and
results, while looking at some discussions in the literature of Harsanyi’s utilitarianism.
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The main mathematical theorem of Harsanyi’s utilitarianism was given in [11]. In ad-
dition to the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility axioms, he gave one additional
axiom, called the Pareto Indiﬀerence, and claimed that personal utilities expressed by
ui’s and ethical (or social) utility expressed by w are connected in the form (1.1). This
is often called the single-profile approach. His own proof had a flaw, but it was later
corrected by Domotor [6].
The Harsanyi-Domotor theorem is simple and suggests a possibility of the existence
of a welfare judgement (a welfare function), opposing to Arrow’s impossibility theo-
rem. In this sense, it has attracted some people’s attention. Nevertheless, even though
the proof was corrected, Harsanyi’s utilitarianism itself has still remained conceptually
unclear and its status in the present welfare economics is not well settled.
Besides the mathematical flaw corrected by Domotor, unclear points and diﬃculties
are related to
(1) the relationship between an individual and society;
(2) interpersonal comparability of utilities.
Harsanyi gave certain arguments for these points. However, he himself had slightly
changed his attitude for (1) in his later papers, but had stuck to one justification for (2)
rather than examined carefully its possibility. In the Harsanyi-Domotor Theorem, it is
unclear where interpersonal comparability of utilities is involved (Mongin [22], p.349).
In the following, we explain our double-profile approach by reflecting on these points.
Harsanyi’s single-profile approach is expressed as an (n+ 1)-tuple of preference re-
lations h¹;¹1, ...,¹ni. The Harsanyi-Domotor Theorem states that if those relations
satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility axioms and the Axiom of Pareto indiﬀer-
ence, then any utility representations w, u1, ..., un of ¹,¹1, ...,¹n are connected in the
form (1.1).
In Harsanyi [10] and [11], ¹1, ...,¹n are regarded as personal preferences and ¹ is
social preferences. In those papers, ¹ could be regarded also as personal ethical prefer-
ences, since in his position of those papers, every individual reached the same personal
ethical preferences ¹, which becomes social preferences. Here he used the famous “veil
of ignorance” argument1 as well as the argument for interpersonal comparability of util-
ities to support the same personal ethical preferences. Later, e.g., in Harsanyi [12] and
[13], he seemed to retreat from claiming ¹ as social preferences and to regard it only as
personal ethical preferences. The reason might come from forcible criticisms given by
several authors. Here, we refer to Pattanaik [26] and Diamond [5].
Pattanaik [26] suggested to separate these preferences into three levels:
(a): personal private preferences;
1The “veil of ignorance” argument is more famous with Rawls [28], but, more or less, the same form
was already given in Harsanyi [10]. However, Rawls claimed to reach the maxmin welfare criterion,
while Harsanyi did his utilitarianism.
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(b): personal ethical preferences;
(c): social preferences.
Personal ethical preferences (b) are obtained by aggregating personal private preferences
(a). Pattanaik suggested two other ways of aggregations: from (a) to (c) and from (b)
to (c). In [12] and [13], Harsanyi admitted and adopted this separation, though he had
stuck to the consideration of (a) and (b). With this separation, we need also to assume
who aggregate preferences (a) to (c) and (b) to (c). In this paper, we will assume that
the hypothetical outside observer aggregates (b) to (c). We assume that a hypothetical
outside observer is intended to be “impersonal” and “impartial”2. We take these as
meaning that the hypothetical outside observer has complete knowledge about personal
ethical preferences (a). We will give a comment on the aggregation from (a) to (c) in
Section 7.
Now, we meet one epistemological problem. If a personal individual is also imper-
sonal and impartial in the sense that he knows (a) objectively as like the hypothetical
outside observer, the above separation would become eﬀectively nothing. Here, we as-
sume that a personal individual aggregating (a) to (b) is an ordinary person in society,
and have very limited and even false knowledge, or may take only some people into
account. This sounds to deviate from an “ethical judgement”. However, as soon as (b)
is separated from (c), these aspects should be inevitably taken into account. We would
like to provide a mathematical framework so as to study the diﬀerence between (b) and
(c).
We provide the above three levels of preferences:
D =
£¹0| h¹i;¹i1, ...,¹ini : i = 1, ..., n¤ , (1.2)
where ¹ij is personal private preferences of individual j believed by individual i, and ¹i
is i’s ethical preferences. Finally, ¹0 is social preferences. We allow ¹ij to be diﬀerent
from j’s preferences ¹jj in j’s mind, even which may diﬀer from the true preferences
observed by the hypothetical observer. In this paper, we do not discuss this problem;
but, instead, we consider aggregations from (a): ¹i1, ...,¹in to (b): ¹i and from (b):
¹1, ...,¹n to (c): ¹0. In Section 7, we will comment on an aggregation from (a) to (c)
as well as on the truthfulness of ¹jj .
The aggregation step from (a) to (b) is, more or less, the same as the Harsanyi-
Domotor Theorem. However, to emphasize diﬀerences from the aggregation step from
(b) to (c), we will discuss the step from (a) to (b) in Section 4. Here, we take the
position that when ¹i is assumed to be obtained from ¹i1, ...,¹in, individual i makes
2Rabinowicz-Österberg [27] suggested the interpretation that personal ethical preferences are con-
structed by a personal individual and social preferences are made by the outside observer. They discussed
this distinction from a philosophical point of view.
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interpersonal comparisons of utilities in the mind of i. We treat this rather as a psy-
chological, maybe, anthropological problem. From the objective ethical-moral point of
view, this is rather arbitrary and depends upon individual i.
The hypothetical outside observer having all information about h¹1, ...,¹ni aggre-
gates them into social preferences ¹0 . In this case, we have the problem of interpersonal
comparability of utilities in the objective and scientific point of view. Even though we
assume the existence of a hypothetical outside observer knowing all about h¹1, ...,¹ni,
the possibility of such comparisons is a diﬀerent problem (see Kaneko [16] and Broome
[2] for arguments against such comparisons). We avoid this problem, but we see where
such interpersonal comparisons of utilities are involved in the aggregation from (b) to
(c) and consider how they are formulated in the double-profile approach.
The last comment is on the use of von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility ax-
ioms for those three levels of preferences. In our approach, the levels (a) and (b) may
not be problematic, since those preferences are individual preferences (cf., Karni [20]).
However, following Diamond’s [5], it may be problematic in assuming expected utility
axioms for social preferences (c). Nevertheless, we take a research strategy to examine
the consequences under the expected utility axioms even for (c). In Section 7, we will
discuss Diamond’s example and also look at the counter argument to it by Nakamura-
Nakayama [23].3
Technically speaking, our results are based on Domotor [6] and Weymark [33], and
some results are almost immediately obtained by combining results in these papers and
some other papers. This paper is intended not to give new technical results but to oﬀer
a framework to reconsider the entire Harsanyi’s preference utilitarianism.
The paper is written as follows: In Section 2.1, we give a quick review of expected
utility theory. This is because of the observation that some diﬃculties in Harsanyi’s
utilitarianism are caused by starting with utility functions rather than with the very
primitive concepts of preferences. In Section 2.2, we review Harsanyi’s single-profile ap-
proach. In Section 3, we will give the double-profile approach. In Section 4, we consider
the aggregation from personal preferences to personal ethical preferences. In Section 5,
we consider the aggregation from personal ethical preferences to social preferences. In
Section 7, we will reconsider our results comparing some papers in the literature.
2. Expected Utility Theory and Harsanyi’s Single-Profile Approach
2.1. Expected Utility Theory
Let X be a finite nonempty set of pure alternatives, which will be interpreted as social
pure alternatives in the main body of the paper. We sometimes write X = {x1, ..., xk}.
3 In the theory of the Nash social welfare fuction given in Kaneko-Nakamura [17], expected utility
theory is assumed at the individual level, but it is not at the social aggregated level.
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Let L(X) be the set of all probability distributions over X, often called prospects. The
set L(X) can be regarded as a subset of R|X|; actually it is the simplex of |X| − 1
dimensions. Restricting the linear structure of R|X| to L(X), we regard L(X) to be
a convex set with respect to the convex operation transferred from R|X|. We denote a
convex combination by αp ∗ (1− α)q, which is here interpreted as a compound prospect
meaning that p occurs with probability α and q occurs with probability 1− α.
A von Neumann-Morgenstern [34] preference relation is a binary relation ¹ on L(X),
and is assumed to satisfy the following three axioms of expected utility theory:
Axiom NM1 (Ordering): ¹ is a complete preordering on L(X).
The symmetric part and asymmetric part of ¹ are now written as ∼ and ≺, respec-
tively. That is, p ∼ q means that p and q are indiﬀerent, and p ≺ q means that q is
strictly preferred to p.
Axiom NM2 (Intermediate Value): If p ¹ r ¹ q, then there is an α ∈ [0, 1] such
that r ∼ αp ∗ (1− α)q.
Axiom NM3 (Independence): Let p, q be arbitrary prospects in L(X).
(1): If p ≺ q, then αp ∗ (1− α)r ≺ αq ∗ (1− α)r for all α ∈ (0, 1) and r ∈ L(X).
(2): If p ∼ q, then αp ∗ (1− α)r ∼ αq ∗ (1− α)r for all α ∈ (0, 1) and r ∈ L(X).
The following is known as the main theorem of expected utility theory:
Theorem 2.1. (Expected Utility Theorem): A binary relation ¹ satisfies Axioms
NM1-NM3 if and only if there is a real-valued function u on L(X) such that
(1): for all p, q ∈ L(X), u(p) ≤ u(q) if and only if p ¹ q;
(2): for all p, q ∈ L(X) and α ∈ [0, 1], u(αp ∗ (1− α)q) = αu(p) + (1− α)u(q).
There are many axiomatizations of expected utility theory such as given in Herstein-
Milnor [14] and Fishburn [7] (see Hammond [9] for a recent survey). The above is a
variant of the axiomatizations given in [14] and [7]. A proof of the above theorem is found
in Kaneko-Wooders [19]. For the results in the following sections, any axiomatization
is fine as far as Theorem 2.1.(1) and (2) are guaranteed.
A real-valued function u satisfying (1) and (2) of Theorem 2.1 is called an von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function representing ¹ . Let U(¹) be the set of all vN-
M utility functions representing ¹ .
One consequence, relevant here, derived from (2) of Theorem 2.1 is that u(p) can be
written as
u(p) =
kP
t=1
ptu(xt) for all p ∈ L(X), (2.1)
5
where we follow the convention that xt is regarded as identical to the unit vector et =
(0, ..., 0, 1, 0, ..., 0) with the t-th coordinate 1. Later, we may use the vector expression
u = (u(x1), ..., u(xk)). Then, (2.1) can be written as the inner product p · u.
We should mention another theorem in expected utility theory, which is known as the
uniqueness theorem (cf., Herstein-Milnor [14] for its proof) and is crucial for Harsanyi’s
preference utilitarianism.
Theorem 2.2. (Uniqueness up to Positive Linear Transformations): vN-M
utility functions u and v are in the same set U(¹) if and only if there are scalars α > 0
and β such that u(p) = αv(p) + β for all p ∈ L(X).
2.2. Harsanyi’s Single-Profile Approach.
Now we give a brief summary of Harsanyi’s single-profile approach and mention the main
theorem, which was originally given by Harsanyi [11] and was corrected by Domotor [6].
Let us consider a society consisting of individuals 1, ..., n. The set of all individuals
is denoted by N = {1, ..., n}. Let i be an individual. A single-profile frame is given as
an n+ 1-tuple h¹;¹1, ...,¹ni, each of which is assumed to satisfy Axioms NM1-NM3.
In our double-profile approach, each ¹i will be interpreted as either personal private
preferences or personal ethical preferences, and correspondingly, ¹ will be interpreted
as either personal ethical preferences or social preferences.
Harsanyi’s [11] Pareto Indiﬀerence is given as follows:
Axiom H (Pareto Indiﬀerent): If p ∼i q for all i ∈ N, then p ∼ q.
That is, if all individuals are indiﬀerent between p and q, then p and q are also
indiﬀerent with respect to ¹ . Only under this axiom, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3 (Harsanyi and Domotor): Assume Axiom H on h¹;¹1, ...,¹ni. Take
an arbitrary u ∈ U(¹) and arbitrary ui ∈ U(¹i) for i = 1, ..., n. Then, there are
α1, ...,αn and β such that
u(p) =
P
i
αiui(p) + β for all p ∈ L(X). (2.2)
In this theorem, α1, ...,αn may not be uniquely determined, and also their signs
may be positive, negative or even zero. However, the unique determination of and the
positivities of α1, ...,αn are important for our research as well as from the viewpoint of
welfare economics.
Here we introduce one notion called a test-transition, which was implicitly used
in Harsanyi [11] and later was more explicitly used (e.g., Fishburn [8], Weymark [33],
d’Aspremont-Gevers [4]). Let h¹;¹1, ...,¹ni be a single-profile frame. We say that two
prospects q and p form a test-transition, denoted by hq Bi pi, for individual i iﬀ q ≺i p
and q ∼j p for all j ∈ N − {i}. That is, in a test-transition hq Bi pi, only individual i’s
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utility is improved but all others remain unchanged. This notion will be a key for our
study.
It was shown in Fishburn [8] that there are test-transitions for all i ∈ N if and only
if the coeﬃcients α1, ...,αn in Theorem 2.3 are uniquely determined. The existence of
test-transitions for all i ∈ N is later called the Independent Prospect condition (see also
Weymark [33] and d’Aspremont-Gevers [4] for more details).
3. Double-Profile Approach
As stated in Section 1, the double-profile frame is given asD =
£¹0| {h¹i;¹i1, ...,¹ini}i∈N¤
in (1.2). Preference relation ¹ij is personal private preferences of individual j believed
by individual i, and preference relation ¹i is personal ethical preferences of individ-
ual i. Finally, ¹0 is social preferences. Throughout the paper, we assume that those
preference relations all satisfy Axiom NM1-NM3.
We will consider the two steps of aggregations:
Step AIB: ¹i is obtained from ¹i1, ...,¹in;
Step BIC: ¹0 is obtained from ¹1, ...,¹n .
These correspond to the aggregations from (a) to (b) and from (b) to (c) in Section 1.
Step AIB is taken by personal individual i, and step BIC is taken by the hypothetical
outside observer4. Thus, these two steps have diﬀerent natures. Here, we discuss the
diﬀerence between these steps before going to the mathematical analysis of them.
In step AIB taken by personal individual i, personal preference relation ¹ij of
individual j is imagined in the mind of individual i. As stated as in Section 1, a personal
individual is supposed to be an ordinary person in society without special knowledge
about society or other people. This means that ¹ij may contain false components or
is simply false. To discuss such falsity, we need to assume the existence of the true
personal preferences. It may be possible to assume that ¹ii is the true one, though this
assumption itself is already quite demanding5. When we consider the aggregation from
(a) to (c), e.g., from h¹11, ...,¹nni to ¹0, these preferences may be regarded as true
ones known to the hypothetical observer. We postpone this problem to Section 7, and
now we consider the aggregation steps AIB and BIC.
Since individual i is an ordinary person, it would be natural for him to take only
his relatives or neighbors seriously into account and simply ignores other people. This
ignorance of some individual j by i is treated as having constant relations ¹ij , i.e., all
4One interpretation of the hypothetical outside observer is the ideal (computation) machine to treat
information. This idea was discussed in Kaneko [16] to argue that it could not make decision unless it
is given rules for mechanical decision making. In this paper, we do not touch this problem.
5For an idividual, having his preferences entirely diﬀers from knowing his own preferences. It is
similar to that we have brains, but we do not know their structur and functionings.
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prospects are indiﬀerent for j in i’s mind. This case will be expressed as coeﬃcients
αij = 0 for utility functions in the theorem to be given in Section 4.
Thus, individual i develops his ethical preferences ¹i in his individualistic manner,
which may be arbitrary from the objective point of view. Nevertheless, assuming the
existence of a well-defined ¹i satisfying NM1-NM3 axioms already involves some type
of interpersonal comparability of utilities (Broome [3]). Here, individual i makes such
comparisons in his individualistic manner.
Interpersonal comparability of utilities is sometimes justified by claiming that real
people are making such comparisons. However, this is entirely diﬀerent from the ex-
istence of an objective and scientific procedure to measure interpersonal comparisons
of utilities. The former is an anthropological observation, and the latter is to demand
the existence of some impersonal and impartial procedure. This will be discussed in
Sections 5 and 7.
Step BIC is conceptually very diﬀerent from step AIB. This step is taken by the
hypothetical outside observer who is assumed to be impersonal and impartial. We
interpret these conditions as meaning that he knows all information about ¹1, ...,¹n
and aggregates them those relations into ¹0 . This is also related to the problem of
interpersonal comparability of utility. In Sections 5 and 7., we will give some comments
on these points.
Although, as pointed out in Section 1, it may be problematic to assume the expected
utility axioms, specifically, Axiom NM3, on ¹0, we avoid to talk about this problem.
Rather we will talk about how interpersonal comparisons of utilities are treated oper-
ationally. While such comparisons are arbitrary for personal ethical preferences, they
cannot be arbitrary in step BIC. Some operational form will be given.
For the above argument, the existence of a test-transition plays an important role.
When the cardinality of X is small relative to n or the variety of ¹1, ...,¹n is small, we
cannot guarantee the existence of test-transitions for all individuals. On the other hand,
when the cardinality of X and ¹1, ...,¹n have some large variety relative to n, we can
have test-transitions. However, since ¹1, ...,¹n are already aggregated concepts and
cannot be given arbitrary, they would have a smaller variety than ¹i1, ...,¹in . Hence,
we should examine a condition for the existence of test-transitions for individuals, which
will be discussed in Section 6.
Let us see that ¹i1, ...,¹in have typically a great variety. Recall that preferences ¹ij
may be relevant j’s private domain of behavior. To describe this idea, one possibility is
to assume that the set of pure alternativesX is given as the product formX =
Q
j∈N Xj ,
and then that ¹ij depends only upon the j-th coordinate Xj . In this case, it may be
the case that the projected preference relations over Xj and Xj0 for j and j0 may be
identical, but the original ¹ij and ¹ij0 are entirely diﬀerent, since they have diﬀerent
relevant coordinates in X. Also the cardinality of X is much larger than the number of
individuals n. For example, even when |Xj | = 2 for all j ∈ N, then n < 2n = |X| . This
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observation about the variety found in ¹i1, ...,¹in will be relevant in the consideration
of the existence of test-transitions in Section 6.
4. From Personal Private Preferences to Personal Ethical Preferences
In this section, we consider an aggregation from personal private preferences to person
ethical preferences. Mathematically speaking, Theorem 2.3 may be regarded as this
aggregation. However, we will give a reformulation to have a clear-cut statement and
state one additional axiom.
We give the following additional axiom for h¹i;¹i1, ...,¹ini.
Axiom PCi (Positive Correlation): There exists a test-transition hq Bi pi for indi-
vidual i such that q ≺i p.
It states that there is some transition from q to p such that only individual i is better
oﬀ, all the others are indiﬀerent between q and p and also individual i ethically prefers
p to q (i.e., q ≺i p). His ethical judgement is made in favor for himself.
Now, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 (Subjective utilitarianism): Assume Axioms H and PCi for h¹i;¹i1
, ...,¹ini. Take an arbitrary ui ∈ U(¹i). There are disjoint subsets N+, N− of N and
uij ∈ U(¹ij) for all j ∈ N+ ∪N− such that i ∈ N+ and
ui(p) =
P
j∈N+
uij(p)−
P
j∈N−
uij(p) for all p ∈ L(X), (4.1)
where uii is uniquely determined.
Without Axiom PCi, this theorem is simply a diﬀerent representation of Theorem
2.3, and N+ may be empty in addition to the possible emptiness of N−. The reason
for presenting this theorem is to emphasize that in the aggregation of personal private
preferences to person ethical preferences, individual i makes his ethical judgement in
his individualistic manner: He can make any judgement. First, N+ consists of people
whose preferences individual i assesses positively; and N− consists of people whose
preferences individual i assesses negatively. Moreover, individual i may ignore people
in N − (N+ ∪N−). It may be the case where N+ ∪N− is a small portion including i
himself in society. If we stick to our interpretation that individual i makes his ethical
judgement in his individualistic manner, this interpretation would be natural.
In the above theorem, uij ’s and N+, N− may not be uniquely determined, since
they may be correlated. One suﬃcient condition for an individual j to belong to N+
(or N−) is that there is a test-transition hq Bj pi for individual j in h¹i;¹i1, ...,¹ini
such that q ≺i p (or p ≺i q, respectively), in which case, uij is uniquely determined.
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Proof of Theorem 4.1. Take an arbitrary ui ∈ U(¹i) and vi1 ∈ U(¹i1), ..., vin ∈
U(¹in). By Theorem 2.3, there are αi1, ...,αin and βi such that
ui(p) =
P
j
αijvij(p) + βi for all p ∈ L(X).
By Axiom PCi, there is a test-transition hq Bi pi for individual i such that q ≺i p.
Using the above formula, we evaluate this test-transition hq Bi pi :
ui(p)− ui(q) = αij(vii(p)− vii(q)).
Since q ≺i p, αii is positive and is uniquely determined to be (ui(p) − ui(q))/(vii(p) −
vii(q)).
Now, let N+ = {j : αij > 0} and N− = {j : αij < 0}. Then, N+ and N− are
disjoint and i ∈ N+. Now, we define: for j ∈ N+, uij(p) = αijvij(p) + βi/ |N+| for all
p ∈ L(X). Then, uij ∈ U(¹ij) for all j ∈ N+ by Theorem 2.2. Also, we define: for
j ∈ N−, uij(p) = −αijvij(p) for all p ∈ L(X). Then, uij ∈ U(¹ij) for all j ∈ N− by
Theorem 2.2. Using those uij ’s, we have (4.1).
5. Aggregation of Personal Ethical Preferences into Social Preferences
In Theorem 4.1(subjective utilitarianism), interpersonal comparability of utilities (pref-
erences) is already included in the assumption of the existence of the well-defined pref-
erences ¹i over L(X). However, this ethical judgement is made by individual i in his
individualistic manner. We did not give any concrete constraint on it. For the aggre-
gation of personal ethical preferences to social preferences, we give a certain axiom on
the aggregation reflecting interpersonal comparisons of utilities.
Now, we give two axioms which look quite diﬀerent from Axiom H, but actually,
these two axioms imply Axiom H. This is related to Weymark’s [33] result, which will
be used in the proof of the main theorem.
The first axiom is as follows:
Axiom WP (Weak Pareto): If q ≺i p for all i ∈ N, then q ≺0 p.
This states that social preferences are positively associated with personal ethical
preferences. This is not yet related to interpersonal comparability of utilities. The next
axiom formulates a necessary condition for interpersonal comparability of utilities. For
any two individuals, utility diﬀerences (preference diﬀerences) are expressed in terms
of test-transitions, and they are compared. The next axiom claims that some utility
diﬀerences give the same eﬀect on social preferences, and hence the results obtained by
the test-transitions are socially indiﬀerent. This is formulated in terms of compound
prospects.
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Figure 5.1: the ICU scale
We formulate interpersonal comparability of utilities in the following form for h¹0:¹1
, ...,¹ni.
Axiom ICU (Interpersonal Comparability of Utilities): For any i, j ∈ N, there
are test-transitions hqBi pi and hq0Bj p0i for i and j, respectively, such that 12p ∗ 12q0 ∼0
1
2q ∗
1
2p
0. Note that all test-transitions are in h¹1, ...,¹ni.
1
2q ∗
1
2q
0
. &
1
2p ∗
1
2q
0 ∼0 12q ∗
1
2p
0
Diagram 5.1
In expected utility theory, utility diﬀerences or preferences over transitions are not
defined6. However, using compound prospects, we can eﬀectively use such diﬀerences.
The idea is depicted in Diagram 5.1. The transition from 12q ∗
1
2q
0 to 12p∗
1
2q
0 is regarded
as test-transition hq Bi pi, and the transition from 12q ∗ 12q0 to 12q ∗ 12p0 is test-transition
hq0 Bj p0i. The intended social indiﬀerence between hq Bi pi and hq0 Bj p0i is expressed
by the social indiﬀerence between 12p ∗
1
2q
0 and 12q ∗
1
2p
0.
Using the utility function u0, this indiﬀerence between the two transitions is written
as
u0(
1
2
p ∗ 1
2
q0)− u0(1
2
q ∗ 1
2
q0) = u0(
1
2
q ∗ 1
2
p0)− u0(1
2
q ∗ 1
2
q0),
from which we have, by Theorem 2.1.(2), 12u
0(p)− 12u0(q) =
1
2u
0(p0)− 12u0(q0), i.e.,
u0(p)− u0(q) = u0(p0)− u0(q0).
6Kaneko [16] used an argument similar to Axiom ICU so as to introduce utility diﬀerences into
(one-person) expected utility theory (see also Shubik [31], Appendix A). This was against Luce-Raiﬀa
[21]’s fallary 3 (p.32) that expected utility theory does not include the notion of utility diﬀerences as its
legitimate components and so utility diﬀerences should not be discussed.
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If we have already u0(·) =Pl∈N ul(·), then this equation becomes ui(p)−ui(q) = uj(p0)−
uj(q0). Thus, Axiom ICU asserts interpersonal comparability of utility diﬀerences, rather
than of absolute utility levels.
It is the basic assumption that the hypothetical outside observer has some objec-
tive and scientific way to make comparisons of utility (preference) diﬀerences, which we
call the ICU scale (Figure 5.1). By this scale the hypothetical outside observer makes
comparisons of individual utility diﬀerences for any two individuals. After some com-
parisons, he can find two utility diﬀerences to balance the ICU scale, which means that
these two utility diﬀerences are equal with respect to the ICU scale. In this case, Axiom
ICU claims that when all the other individuals are fixed, the two utility diﬀerences are
evaluated as the same with respect to social preferences.
Now, we state the main theorem of this section. After presenting the theorem, we
will discuss how we interpret Axiom ICU with respect to interpersonal comparability of
utilities.
Theorem 5.1 (From Personal Ethical to Social Preferences I): Assume Axioms
WP and ICU for h¹0:¹1, ...,¹ni. Take an arbitrary u0 ∈ U(¹0). There are (u1, ..., un) ∈
U(¹1)× ...× U(¹n) such that
(1): u0(p) =
P
i∈N u
i(p) for all p ∈ L(X);
(2): if hqBi pi and hq0Bj p0i are test-transitions for individuals i, j ∈ N given in Axiom
ICU, then
ui(p)− ui(q) = uj(p0)− uj(q0). (5.1)
Before a proof of Theorem 5.1, we will give various comments on the theorem. In
this theorem, Axiom H is not needed and is, actually, obtained from Axioms WP and
ICU. This will be clearer when we give a proof of the theorem. The logical independence
of Axioms WP and ICU will also become clear in our proof of the theorem.
We have alternative formulations of the above theorem. Here, we mention one
alternative formulation7. In Axiom ICU, utility diﬀerences between any two people
are compared, and test-transitions are allowed to depend upon two individuals. An
alternative formulation of Axiom ICU is to require the existence of partially common
test-transitions for all people.
Axiom ICU∗: There are test-transitions {hqi Bi pii :i ∈ N} such that for all i, j ∈ N,
qi = qj = q and n−1n q ∗
1
np
i ∼0 n−1n q ∗
1
np
j .
7Another alternative to Axiom ICU is given in d’Aspremont-Gevers [4] in the analysis of a social
welfare function: Axiom ICU0 : for all i, i0, there are p, q ∈ L(X) such that p ≺i q, q ≺i0 p, p ∼j q for
all j 6= i, i0 and p ∼0 q. Theorem 5.1 remains valid if we keep Axiom WP, replace Axiom ICU by ICU0
and additionally assume Minimum Agreement condition: for some p, q ∈ L(X), p ≺i q for all i ∈ N.
This can be proved using Weymark’s [33] theorem (Lemma 5.1 in this paper).
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We can replace Axiom ICU by this ICU∗ for Theorem 5.1. The proof, given below,
of Theorem 5.1 can be modified slightly to obtain this version. Actually, Axiom ICU∗
is equivalent to Axiom ICU under the expected utility axioms NM1-NM3 and Axiom
WP.
Theorem 5.1 is formulated in order to see in what way interpersonal comparability
of utilities is involved. However, it is also possible to formulate the essentially same
theorem by avoiding an explicit formulation of interpersonal comparability of utilities,
which was given by Weymark [33]. We contrast Theorem 5.1 with the theorem without
using an explicit formulation of interpersonal comparability of utilities.
First, we modify Axiom PCi h¹i;¹i1, ...,¹ini into the following:
Axiom PC (Positive Correlation): There exist test-transitions {hqi Bi pii : i ∈ N}
in h¹0:¹1, ...,¹ni such that qi ≺0 pi.
It states that every individual i has a transition hqiBi pii so that the society prefers
pi to qi. Here, interpersonal comparability of utilities is not explicit. However, we have
the same consequence as Theorem 5.1, which was, more or less, included in Weymark
[33] for the single-profile approach.
Theorem 5.2 (From Personal Ethical to Social Preferences II): Assume Axioms
H and PC for h¹0:¹1, ...,¹ni. Take an arbitrary u0 ∈ U(¹0). There are (u1, ..., un) ∈
U(¹1)× ...× U(¹n) such that
(1): u0(p) =
P
i∈N u
i(p) for all p ∈ L(X);
(2): for any i, j ∈ N, there are test transitions hq Bi pi and hq0 Bj p0i for i, j ∈ N such
that (5.1) holds.
Thus, interpersonal comparability of utility diﬀerences is not explicitly formulated,
but (2) means that it is derived from the other axioms. We interpret this as meaning that
interpersonal comparability of utility diﬀerences is already included in h¹0:¹1, ...,¹ni.
This is the view of Broome [3], which we mentioned in Section 3.
The first assertion of this theorem can be proved in the same as the proof of Theorem
4.1, but the second assertion will be proved in the end of this section.
Let us return to Theorem 5.1. Since it asserts a representation of ¹0, (1) can be
replaced by
(1∗): u0(p) =
1
n
P
i∈N u
i(p) for all p ∈ L(X).
As far as we take Theorem 5.1 as a representation theorem, we have no conceptual
diﬀerence between (1) and (1∗). However, from the the viewpoint of Harsanyi’s [10]
“veil of ignorance”, we should take (1∗). We adopt (1) for the main theorem since there
are no diﬀerences in their welfare implications and since (1) is simpler than (1∗).
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Besides the fact the single-profile approach includes implicitly interpersonal com-
parability as mentioned above, we may ask why Axiom ICU is not assumed in the
aggregation from personal private preferences (a) to personal ethical preferences (b).
As already stressed several times, a personal individual may be very individualistic
and not impartial: He may evaluate other people’s private preferences negatively or
even may ignore their existence. For this reason, we impose Axiom ICU for only the
aggregation by the hypothetical outside observer.
As far as¹ij and ¹ij0 are positively taken in the scope of individual i, we may assume
Axiom ICU for between j and j0 in the mind of individual i, like Theorem 5.2. That is,
we can have Axiom ICU for j and j0 in the mind of individual i under the assumption
of the existence of test-transitions for j and j0 in h¹i;¹i1, ...,¹ini. Thus, to this extent,
we can have Axiom ICU for the aggregation from (a) to (b). When ¹ij and ¹ij0 are
negatively associated by individual i, we need to consider negative test-transitions for
individuals j and j.
Among people close each other such as family members, some ways having the prop-
erty described by Axiom ICU may be used even for a personal individual’s comparisons.
They follow social custom or convention taught by elders. If some have positive evalu-
ations each other, Axiom ICU holds eﬀectively for them.
The above paragraphs raise a question of what aspect of interpretational comparisons
of utilities Axiom ICU captures. We have assumed the existence of a procedure to
measure utility diﬀerences interpersonally, which is expressed by the ICU scale. Now, the
very basic problem is whether or not we can define such a procedure in an objective and
scientific (impersonal and impartial) manner. Axiom ICU describes only the necessary
condition for such a scale, assuming its existence. This problem will be discussed again
in Section 7.
For a proof of Theorem 5.1, we start with Weymark’s [33], p.216, Theorem 2.
Lemma 5.1 (Weymark): Let h¹;¹1, ...,¹ni be a single-profile frame satisfying Axiom
WP. Then, for any u ∈ U(¹) and ui ∈ U(¹i), i ∈ N, there are η ≥ 0, αi ≥ 0, i ∈ N and
β such that αj > 0 for some j ∈ N and
ηu(p) =
P
i∈N
αiui(p) + β for all p ∈ N. (5.2)
In addition, if we have some p, q ∈ L(X) with q ≺i p for all i ∈ N, then, η is positive.
Using Lemma 5.1, we can now prove Theorem 5.1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. To prove this theorem, we need to show observation that
there are p, q ∈ L(X) such that q ≺i p for all i ∈ N and q ≺0 p. (5.3)
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This is not guaranteed by Axiom WP, but follows from Axioms ICU and WP.8 By
Axiom ICU, we have test-transitions {hqiBi pii : i ∈ N}.We let q = ( 1nq1 ∗ ...∗ 1nqn) and
p = ( 1np
1∗ ...∗ 1npn). Then, for any i ∈ N and any vi ∈ U(¹i), we have vi(qj) = vi(pj) for
j 6= i and vi(qi) < vi(pi) since {hqiBi pii : i ∈ N} are test-transitions for all individuals.
This implies
vi(q) =
1
n
(
P
j 6=i
vi(qj) + vi(qi)) <
1
n
(
P
j 6=i
vi(pj) + vi(pi)) = vi(p).
Since this strict inequality holds for all i ∈ N, we have q ≺0 p by Axiom WP9. Thus,
we have the minimal agreement condition for h¹0;¹1, ...,¹ni.
Now, take an arbitrary u0 ∈ U(¹0) and v1 ∈ U(¹1), ..., vn ∈ U(¹n). By Lemma 5.1,
we have α1, ...,αn and β0 such that
u0(p) =
P
j
αjvj(p) + β0 for all p ∈ L(X). (5.4)
Here, we can assume η = 1 in (5.2) by a transformation since η > 0 by the additional
statement of Lemma 5.1. Now, we show that αj > 0 for all j ∈ N. Once this is proved,
we can define uj(·) = αjvj(·) + β0/n for all j ∈ N. Then we have the first assertion.
By (5.3), there are p, q such that 0 < u0(p) − u0(q) and 0 < vj(p) − vj(q) for all
j ∈ N. Thus, αi > 0 for at least one individual i.
Now, we take any i0 6= i. Then, by Axiom ICU, we find test-transitions hq Bi pi
and hq0 Bi0 p0i for i and i0 with 12p ∗ 12q0 ∼0 12q ∗ 12p0. This together with (5.4) impliesP
j αj(
1
2v
j(p) + 12v
j(q0)) =
P
j αj(
1
2v
j(q) + 12v
j(p0)), which is equivalent toP
j
αj(vj(p)− vj(q)) =
P
j
αj(vj(p0)− vj(q0)). (5.5)
Since hq Bi pi and hq0 Bi0 p0i are test-transitions for i and i0, respectively, (5.5) implies
αi(vi(p)− vi(q)) = αi0(vi
0
(p0)− vi0(q0)). (5.6)
Now, 0 < αi by the previous result and 0 < vi(p) − vi(q) because hq Bi pi is a test-
transition. Thus, we have 0 < αi0(vi
0
(p0) − vi0(q0)). Since 0 < vi0(p0) − vi0(q0) because
hq0 Bi0 p0i is a test-transition, we have αi0 > 0. Now, we have shown that αj > 0 for all
j ∈ N.
When we set uj(·) = αjvj(·) + β0/n for all j ∈ N, we have assertions (1) by (5.4)
and (2) by (5.6).
8This assertion was given as Proposition 3 in Weymark [33]. But for the reader’s convenience sake,
we give a proof of it.
9This argument for the existence of p, q was suggested by Mongin in his personal communication to
Weymark (see Weymark [33].)
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Proof of Theorem 5.2.(2): By Axiom PC, we have test-transitions hqi Bi pii and
hqj Bj pji for any individuals i, j. By (1) of this theorem, we have ui(pi) − ui(qi) > 0
and uj(pj) − uj(qj) > 0. Suppose ui(pi) − ui(qi) ≥ uj(pj) − uj(qj). Then, there is an
α > 0 such that α(ui(pi) − ui(qi)) = uj(pj) − uj(qj). Then, let p∗ = αpi + (1 − α)qi.
Then, ui(p∗)− ui(qi) = α(ui(pi)− ui(qi)) = uj(pj)− uj(qj).
6. Remarks on the Existence of Test-Transitions
Each personal ethical preference relation ¹i is obtained by aggregating personal private
preferences ¹i1, ...,¹in . Therefore, ¹1, ...,¹n may have some similarity to prevent from
having test-transitions. We start with one example.
Example 6.1: We suppose that the personal ethical preferences are all the same,
i.e., ¹1= ... = ¹n . Then, no individual has any test-transition, i.e., if i prefers p to
q, all the others prefer the same. This is an extreme case, but it may come from the
following situation: Suppose that every individual i has the same beliefs over the private
preference relations of others, that is, ¹ij= ¹i0j for all i, i0, j ∈ N. It is still allowed that
¹ij varies with j. If all individuals i have an identical aggregation principles from (a) to
(b), then we could have ¹1= ... = ¹n . However, if ¹ij and ¹i0j are diﬀerent and/or if
their aggregation principles are diﬀerent, we would expect some variety in ¹1, ...,¹n .
Thus, it is not immediate to see whether or not h¹1, ...,¹ni have test-transitions.
Here, we consider conditions for the existence of test-transitions. The first result for
the existence of a test-transition is about a fixed individual i. For the following theorem,
recall the vector expression u = (u(x1), ..., u(xk)) introduced in Section 2.
Theorem 6.1 (Existence of a Test-Transition for One): There is a test-transition
hq Bi pi for individual i if and only if for any u1 ∈ U(¹1), .., un ∈ U(¹n), ui cannot be
expressed as a linear combination of (uj)j 6=i and 1 = (1, ..., 1), i.e., there are no (αj)j 6=i
and β satisfying
ui =
P
j 6=i
αjuj + β1. (6.1)
Proof. (If ): We prove the contrapositive of the assertion. Suppose that there is no
test-transition hq Bi pi for individual i. It means that for any p, q ∈ L(X), if p ∼j q
for any j 6= i, then p ∼i q. This is regarded as Axiom H (Pareto Indiﬀerence) for
h¹i; (¹j)j 6=ii. Hence, we can apply Theorem 2.3 (Harsanyi-Domotor) to this, and then
for any ui ∈ U(¹i), uj ∈ U(¹j) (j 6= i), we have coeﬃcients (αj)j 6=i and β satisfying
ui(p) =
P
j 6=i
αjuj(p) + β for all p ∈ L(X).
Letting p = xt for each t = 1, ..., k, we have (6.1). This means the negation of the latter
statement of the theorem.
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(Only-If ): We prove also the contrapositive of the assertion. Suppose that for any
ui ∈ U(¹i) and any uj ∈ U(¹j) (j 6= i), there are coeﬃcients (αj)j 6=i and β satisfying
(6.1). From this, we obtain, for all p ∈ L(X),
ui(p) = p · ui = p · (P
j 6=i
αju
j + β1) =
P
j 6=i
αj
kP
t=1
pt(u
j(xt) + β) =
P
j 6=i
αju
j(p) + β. (6.2)
Now, let p, q be any prospects. Suppose q ≺i p. Then, ui(q) < ui(p). By (6.2), uj(q) 6=
uj(p) for some j 6= i. This means that there is no test-transition for individual i.
Combining the above theorem for all individuals, we have the following theorem due
to Weymark [33], p.213, Proposition 2.
Theorem 6.2 (Existence of Test-Transitions for All): For all i ∈ N there is a
test-transition hqBipi for i if and only if for any u1 ∈ U(¹1), ..., un ∈ U(¹n), the vectors
u1, ...,un,1 are linearly independent in the sense of linear algebra.
This theorem states that to have test-transitions for all i ∈ N, vectors u1, ...,un,1 are
linear independent, which implies that the attainable utility set, i.e., the convex hull of
u1, ...,un,1 is n dimensions. Recall that each of u1, ...,un,1 is a k-vector. When k = |X|
is larger than n, and when h¹11, ...,¹1ni, ..., h¹n1, ...,¹nni are diversified enough, the
linear independence of u1, ...,un,1 is typically expected. As stated in the last paragraph
of Section 3, |X| is expected to be much larger than n. Unless the personal aggregation
procedure from h¹11, ...,¹1ni, ..., h¹n1, ...,¹nni to ¹1, ...,¹n are perfectly uniform, we
can expect enough varieties in ¹1, ...,¹n . In sum, it would be expected to have test-
transitions for all individuals.
7. Discussions
We provided the double-profile approach to Harsanyi’s preference utilitarianism, and
considered the two steps of aggregations. In the first step from personal private prefer-
ences h¹i1, ...,¹ini to personal ethical preferences ¹i, the aggregation theorem we gave
was, more or less, the same as the Harsanyi-Domotor Theorem. In the second step from
personal ethical preferences h¹1, ...,¹ni to social preferences ¹0, Axiom ICM was the
main axiom for aggregation. The axiomatizations of those steps were given so as to
explain the conceptual diﬀerence between these two steps.
In the first step, we gave Axiom PDi to determine only the positive association
between individual i’s private preferences and his ethical preferences. The other indi-
viduals’ personal preferences are associated with i’s ethical preferences in an arbitrary
way. We interpret this as meaning that individual i could make ethical judgement in
his individualistic manner.
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Contrary to the first step, in the second step, we required two axioms, one of which
describes a way of interpersonal comparisons of utility diﬀerences. We simply formulated
this axiom as the form as if the hypothetical outside observer has a well-defined scale
to measure utility diﬀerences. Although interpersonal comparability of utilities is one
central issue, before the consideration of it, perhaps, we should give some comments on
the aggregation from personal private preferences (a) to social preferences (c), and also
on the expected utility axioms on social preferences.
There are two ways for the aggregation from (a) to (c). One is simply to concatenate
the aggregation from (a) to (b) to the aggregation from (b) to (c). This means to combine
Theorems 4.1 and 5.1. For the double-profile frame D =
£¹0| {h¹i;¹i1, ...,¹ini}i∈N¤ ,
we assume Axioms H and PCi for each h¹i;¹i1, ...,¹ini and Axioms WP, ICU for
h¹0;¹1, ...,¹ni, in addition to Axioms NM1-NM3 for all the preference relations. Then,
we have
u0(p) =
P
i∈N
(
P
j∈N+i
uij(p)−
P
j∈N−i
uij(p)) for all p ∈ L(X),
where we put the subscript i to the set N+ and N− given by Theorems 4.1 for h¹i;¹i1
, ...,¹ini. In this aggregation, personal private preferences are counted several times,
which was the criticism given by Ng [25].
The above aggregation is a straightforward concatenation of the two steps. Here,
it would be more important to remark about the aggregation from (a) to (c) from the
viewpoint of the hypothetical outside observer. In this case, it does not make sense to
take all subjective preferences ¹i1, ...,¹in, i ∈ N. Instead, the observer should take the
true preferences if they ever exist. If ¹11, ...,¹nn are true preferences, he aggregates
them directly to ¹0, which takes the same form as Theorem 5.1. The existence of true
preferences may be problematic, but this criticism can be applied to the existence of
other preferences. Another possible criticism is that individual i’s personal preferences
include ethical sentiments as well as private ones. It means that the separation between
(a) and (b) may be diﬃcult. This was suggested by Sobel’s [32], p.259. Nevertheless,
if personal private preferences can be defined, his suggestion is interpreted as meaning
that (b) is obtained from (a). At any rate, we should admit that there are a lot of subtle
conceptual problems around these interpretations.
Now, let us consider the adoption of Axioms NM1-NM3 for all preferences; in par-
ticular, Axiom NM3 may be problematic to social preferences. We may say that it is
not problematic for personal private preferences (a) and personal ethical preferences
(b), but is problematic certainly for social preferences (c). One reason is the counterex-
ample given by Diamond [5] for social preferences10. Here, we look at his example and
a counter argument given by Nakamura-Nakayama [23], since by examining them, we
10The example given by Diamond [5] was already suggested by Hobbes [15], Part I, Chap.15, the 13th
Law of Nature.
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can see some consistency and closedness of the world of Harsanyi.
In the example, an indivisible unit M is distributed to two people 1 and 2. Con-
sider two social alternatives: (M, 0) and (0,M), i.e., the indivisible unit M is given
to individual 1 or 2 respectively. Under the assumption that these two individuals are
symmetrically identical, we can assume that these two social alternatives are socially
indiﬀerent, i.e., (M, 0) ∼0 (0,M). By Axiom NM3.(2), we have
1
2
(M, 0) ∗ 1
2
(0,M) ∼0 1
2
(0,M) ∗ 1
2
(0,M) = (0,M).
Similarly, 12(M, 0) ∗
1
2(0,M) ∼0 (M, 0). Thus, the prospect
1
2(M, 0) ∗
1
2(0,M) is socially
indiﬀerent to simply giving M to one individual, though the prospect (lottery) gives
each individual a fair chance to get M. Diamond [5] criticized that the prospect giving
a fair chance should be socially preferred to simply giving M to one person.
Nakamura-Nakayama [23] gave a counter argument based on Harsanyi [10] to the
criticism by Diamond. Their counter argument starts with the assumption that the
social (or ethical) evaluations of (M, 0) and (0,M) should be made in the original
position before the veil of ignorance. The evaluation of (M, 0) in the original position
is described as 12 [(1, 2) : (M, 0)] ∗
1
2 [(2, 1) : (M, 0)], meaning that with probability
1
2 ,
individual in question would take position 1, and with the remaining probability, he
would take the position 2. Hence, neither (M, 0) nor (0,M) could appear in the premise
of Axiom NM3.(2). Thus, even if individual 2 is shown to the present situation (M, 0),
he should think of a chance to get M behind (M, 0). Nakamura-Nakayama concluded
that in the scope of Harsanyi’s [10] view, Diamond’s example is not really a counter
example.
Reflecting carefully on the above argument, however, we would notice that Axiom
NM3 is trivialized by falsifying its premise. If we follow this argument, we would not
adopt the whole expected utility theory since only some specific probability distribution
is allowed. Even though we forget this diﬃculty, it would be unclear from the beginning
why we should think about Diamond’s example in the scope of [10] view, since the
original position given by Harsanyi [10] is a purely hypothetical concept constructed
by himself. Diamond’s [5] example sounds still natural and important for us to take
it seriously. This is compatible with the suggestion by Sen [29] that the social welfare
function should be nonlinear with respect to probability.
To a certain extent, those arguments are applied to personal ethical preferences if the
individual ethical judgement shares the same principle or its part with the hypothetical
outside observer. Actually we can avoid NM3 to construct a social preference relation,
which is the theory of the Nash social welfare function given in Kaneko-Nakamura [17].
However, to discuss whether or not we should adopt Axiom NM3 for social preferences,
we need some models of an individual being and the hypothetical outside observer,
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as given in Kaneko [16]. Without giving such models, only arguments based on our
“intuition” are possible.
This last comment is also related to the problem of interpersonal comparability of
utilities. Axiom ICU describes one necessary function of an objective and scientific scale
to allow interpersonal comparisons of utility diﬀerences, under the assumption of the
existence of such a scale. However, the possibility of such existence is diﬃcult to be
supported. Kaneko [16] and Broome [2] criticized such a possibility examining the very
basis of individual preferences.
Nevertheless, there is another route to define interpersonal comparisons of utilities.
Typically in the literature, the route from interpersonal comparisons to social prefer-
ences (social welfare) has been discussed. Another possibility is to reverse this order, i.e.,
social preferences are first defined and then interpersonal comparisons are defined based
on the social preferences. In Theorem 5.2, we avoid the explicit use of interpersonal
comparability of utilities. Nevertheless, its second assertion implies that interpersonal
comparability of utility diﬀerences are already involved in the axiomatization. A dif-
ferent possibility of defining social welfare diﬀerences was suggested and discussed in
Kaneko-Nakamura [18] along the line of Alt [1] and Shapley [30]. Kaneko-Nakamura
adopted an axiom to define social welfare diﬀerences for the Nash social welfare func-
tion proposed in [17]11. This consideration is possible only for the Nash social welfare
function, but is not applied to Harsanyi’s preference utilitarianism.
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